From: | Tettenborn A.M. <a.m.tettenborn@swansea.ac.uk> |
To: | Andrew Dickinson <andrew.dickinson@stcatz.ox.ac.uk> |
CC: | obligations@uwo.ca |
Date: | 15/08/2019 11:22:03 UTC |
Subject: | Re: Privilege without Confidentiality in the HCA |
One example: ETK v MGN [2011] EWCA Civ 439. The injunction was granted, presumably under s.37(1), to a celebrity with no right to privacy, to protect the alleged human rights not of him but of his children, who were not even a party to the action. This seems to me outrageous: if the children wish to restrict the paper's freedom of speech, they can be expected at the very least to sue.
Andrew
Which cases on s. 37 (or its equivalents) do you have in mind? If one takes as a starting point the summary given by Nugee J in Holyoake v Candy [2016] EWHC 970 (Ch), at [8], the overall position (if not entirely settled) seems far from a free exercise of judicial discretion. The word "just", as it seems to me, requires a sufficient legal basis for the grant of an injunction in the claimant's favour against the defendant.
If anything, the position seems to me to be more controlled today than in the period before the Judicature Acts during which the Court of Chancery seems to me to have on occasions lost its focus on whether the defendant's conduct was "unconscionable" in law (i.e. prohibited according to the rules of equity) into a free ranging enquiry into what the judge considered to be a "just outcome". The case law on anti-suit injunctions, for example, showed this tendency and this has resulted in problems in the modern era.
Best wishes
Andrew
Professor Andrew Dickinson
Fellow and Tutor in LawSt Catherine's College
Manor Road
Oxford
OX1 3UJ
Tel. +44 (0)1865 281434 / Mobile +44 (0)7881 588871
andrew.dickinson@stcatz.ox.ac.uk
From: Tettenborn A.M. <a.m.tettenborn@swansea.ac.uk>
Sent: 15 August 2019 08:37
To: Gerard Sadlier <gerard.sadlier@gmail.com>; obligations <obligations@uwo.ca>
Subject: Re: Privilege without Confidentiality in the HCAI agree that it's a bit odd that there should be no confidence here (unless disclosure was in the public interest).
Absent confidence, howeveer, I'm a bit unhappy about granting injunctions to those with no rights to protect or duties to enforce. Injunctions are drastic remedies, involving the judge (as Tony Weir once put it) taking off his wig and donning a helmet; if I'm not breaking a duty owed to anyone I shouldn't on principle be liable to be bossed around. The increasingly wide interpretation attached to s.37 of our Senior Courts Act and its analogues elsewhere is in my view worrying.
I should add that in the European field I'm equally unhappty about the morphing of the ECHR into a sourse of rights against anyone other than the state, and decry the trigger-happy use of injunctions in that connection too.
Andrew
On 15/08/19 00:32, Gerard Sadlier wrote:
Dear all Some of you will be aware of the High Court of Australia's judgment in Glencore International AG v Commissioner of Taxation [2019] HCA 26 (14 August 2019) http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/cth/HCA//2019/26.html In brief, the applicant sought an injunction to restrain use by the Commissioner of Taxation of documents over which the applicant claimed legal professional privilege and which had been disclosed as part of the so-called Paradise Papers leak. The applicant argued that privilege was in itself sufficient to justify the grant of an injunction and that it did not have to rely on the law of confidentiality for this purpose. The Court held the privilege is an immunity, not a right which would justify the grant of an injunction, in the absence of confidentiality, which would justify the grant of injunctive relief. I must confess, with the utmost respect, that I find the reasoning conclusory at best. A number of questions do also seem to arise though: 1. The case was put on the basis that privilege would justify the grant of injunctive relief, without reference to the law of confidence. I am sure that I am missing something here but that seems to me a baffling concession. Whatever one's view of the Paradise Papers leak, the fact remains that confidential documents were disclosed without the consent of those like Glencore who had a right to that confidence. Everyone, including the Commissioner is presumably aware of how these documents became public. In those circumstances, why would the Commissioner not be impressed with an obligation to respect that confidence, as against Glencore, in much the same way as a third party is obliged by equity not to accept the disclosure of information which he knows is being provided by an employee in breach of confidence. Was there a concern that the Commissioner might successfully rely on a public interest or statutory defence? 2. Does the HCA's reasoning suggest that a different result would be reached where privilege is constitutionally protected or guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights? There, arguably at least, it is in reality a substantive legal right. 3. To ask 1 in another way, how can privilege be claimed at all by a party who cannot say either that (i) the documents are in fact be confidential or (ii) the documents should and would be confidential but for some wrongful act of the other side or of which the other side is on notice? Any comments would be most welcome as I have rarely left a judgment of the HCA so unsatisfied. Kind regards GEr
Australasian Legal Information Institute (AustLII), a joint facility of UTS and UNSW Faculties of Law.
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Andrew Tettenborn
Professor of Commercial Law, Swansea University
Institute for International Shipping and Trade Law
School of Law, University of Swansea
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Andrew Tettenborn
Athro yn y Gyfraith Fasnachol, Prifysgol Abertawe
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Andrew Tettenborn Professor of Commercial Law, Swansea University Institute for International Shipping and Trade Law
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Andrew Tettenborn Athro yn y Gyfraith Fasnachol, Prifysgol Abertawe Sefydliad y Gyfraith Llongau a Masnach Ryngwladol |
See us on Twitter:
@swansea_dst
Read the IISTL Blog: iistl.wordpress.com
Read Andrew's other writing
here and
here
Disclaimer: This email (including any attachments) is for the use of the intended recipient only and may contain confidential information and/or copyright material. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and delete this email and all copies from your system. Any unauthorized use, disclosure, reproduction, copying, distribution, or other form of unauthorized dissemination of the contents is expressly prohibited. |